summary: This paper challenges the view that British medical parliamentarians were a rare breed whose limited presence was felt most during the late-Victorian period. Focused on the interwar "movement" for a medical lobby in Parliament, it identifies 159 medical candidates (of whom 72 were elected). It traces the motivations of the British Medical Association in promoting this movement, and shows how the BMA's goals were subverted in part by the identity interests and agendas of the medical men and women who sought election. The paper also highlights some of the alternative political strategies that the profession attempted to use to promote its interests. In addition to providing a window on the culture and politics of British medicine in the interwar period, it explains why the place of doctors in the House of Commons cannot be seen as contributing to the emergence of professional society as defined by Harold Perkin.
have been a rare breed. 1 Medical historian Anne Hardy, casting her net to include scientists as well as doctors in the House of Commons between ca. 1868 and 1910, identifies only ten such members of Parliament (MPs) and concludes that the late-Victorian period may have been exceptional in involving British doctors in parliamentary politics to any significant extent. 2 Such findings fit with the predominantly antistatist impression of British medicine before the National Health Service (NHS). It accords, too, with most histories of medical politics in Britain, which are mainly preoccupied with one of two interrelated issues: the professional and political divisions within medicine, 3 and the effects of legislation upon medical practice-above all, the impact of the National Health Insurance Bill of 1911, and the NHS Bill of 1946. 4 In common with these studies, the only systematic account of pressure-group politics in British medicine gives short shrift to the role of parliamentary representation.
5
Yet at elections between 1918 and 1945 some 159 medical practitioners sought to enter Parliament, of whom seventy-two were successful (Appendices 1 and 2). 6 As Figure 1 shows, at the eight general elections MPs, 1970 -75 (Westmead, Hampshire: Gower, 1981 . 5. Harry Eckstein, Pressure Group Politics: The Case of the British Medical Association (London: Allen & Unwin, 1960), pp. 76-78. 6. Included among the seventy-two successful candidates are three who were not medically qualified but who acted prominently on behalf of medical (especially BMA) interests: the educationalist Sir Henry Craik, the zoologist Sir John G. Kerr, and the pharmacist Hugh Linstead. Parliament, vols. 3 (1919 Parliament, vols. 3 ( -1945 and 4 (1945-1979 ) , ed. M. Stenton and S. Lees (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1978 ; Medical Directory; and F. W. S. Craig, ed., British Parliamentary Election Results, 1918 -1949 , 3rd ed. (London: Parliamentary Research Services, 1983 . 14 Nov. 1935 over the period there were never fewer than twenty-four medical candidates. On average, slightly less than 50 percent succeeded in making it to Westminster. The aggregate numbers are of course tiny compared to lawyers and businessmen in the Commons; nevertheless, they are sufficient to challenge assumptions about the lack of a medical presence, or wouldbe presence, in national politics. They also challenge Hardy's conclusion as to the period of greatest parliamentary significance for doctors.
I will explore here both the motives behind these parliamentary aspirants, and the professional and other tensions they raised. Focusing on the politics of medicine during the interwar period, I will ask why then, as neither before or after, did so many practitioners seek to enter Parliament? 7 This question is all the more pressing in view of the fact that, then as now, other kinds of nonparliamentary strategies were open to the profession for the prosecution of their interests (such as hiring public relations firms to manipulate and leak information to the press and have questions raised in Parliament). But were the motives of these doctors in fact corporate and strategic, or merely personal? If the latter, their numbers may not matter. If the former, why, in particular, was the legislative assembly pursued? In Britain, prior to the NHS, local councils were responsible for most of the initiatives in health policy, and during the interwar period, these local councils were strong while the central Ministry of Health was weak. If a politically minded doctor was interested in medical reform, therefore, the House of Commons was not necessarily the best place for action. So what kind of aspirations were doctors hoping to fulfill in this forum, and what kind of authority could they hope to command? How, moreover, did professional interests intersect with the demands of constituencies, the prejudices of local affiliations, and the pressures of party politics? Within the Commons, did nonmedical MPs regard medical knowledge (as opposed to medico-professional politics) as above politics? Were nonmedical MPs able to distinguish the one from the other? (For that matter, were medical MPs able to make this distinction, and could the public?) If, as Harold Perkin contends, lay deference to medical authority within government was all but total by the time the NHS was introduced because by then "professional society" had been made, 8 what signs are there of this in the interwar period?-a period, it might be noted, before British MPs (uniquely) began to hold "surgeries" 7. Between 1945 and 1979 , a total of only twenty-eight doctors were elected to the Commons.
8. Harold Perkin, The Rise of Professional Society: England Since 1880 (London: Routledge, 1989), p. 347. for their constituents, and long before "spin doctors" as such came into political prominence.
Not all these questions can be answered here (nor can we address the rise of such metaphors). And there are problems with asking some of them, insofar as they harbor assumptions about the autonomy of medical representatives. Yet, even if we cannot be certain of the motives of all 159 candidates, it is clear that their decision to stand for election was not arbitrarily made: it was bound to wider professional considerations, and to a broader political culture in which professionals were increasingly conspicuous.
9 It is also evident during the Edwardian period, and subsequently, that many doctors sought to enter the Commons out of a declared need for a medical lobby in Parliament. Indeed, this objective was sufficiently well understood and coordinated after World War I to be referred to as a "movement."
10 Historically, it could even be regarded as a part of a transnational movement, for German doctors after the war similarly sought representation in the Reichstag and, in fact, looked to British doctors as among the exemplars of this "tradition."
11 As such, the parliamentary efforts of British doctors constitute a part of a larger professional narrative, the particulars and consequences of which have largely escaped the notice of historians. Furthermore, whether or not these professionals sought to enter the Commons for the purpose of pursuing corporate interests, they were routinely assessed in that light by medico-politicians inside and outside the House-often negatively, as acting in the manner of a trades union. To that extent, all medical MPs and would-be medical MPs were enrolled in corporate politics.
This article concentrates on three issues: how and why medical practitioners became interested in parliamentary politics; the strategies they devised to assist their entry into Parliament; and the extent to which their efforts can be regarded as successful from a corporatist point of view. (Reserved for future analysis is the authority of medical practitioners 9. Forty-eight percent of Conservative MPs and 18.6 percent of Labour MPs elected between 1922 and 1935 were from the professional classes: see Michael Rush, "The Members of Parliament," in The House of Commons in the Twentieth Century, ed. S. A. Walkland (Oxford: Clarendon, 1979) , pp. 87, 114. Among Conservative MPs, professionals rose from fifty-two (for the 1918-35 period) to sixty-one in 1945; among Labour, the rise over the same period was from twenty-five to forty-nine. Parliament (London: Harrison, 1918), p. 2. 11. Robert Gaupp, "Der Arzt als Erzieher seines Volkes," Blätter für Volksgesundheitspflege, 1919 , 19: 77-80, cited in Paul Lerner, Hysterical Men: War, Psychiatry, and the Politics of Trauma in Germany, 1890 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003 , chap. 7: "Dictatorship of the Psychopaths." once within the Commons.) The first section elaborates the Edwardian background to the idea of electing doctors to Parliament, while the second focuses on the mechanism that the British Medical Association (BMA) adopted for funding prospective medical candidates. The third and final part pursues a biographical analysis of the 159 parliamentary aspirants in order to determine the extent to which conclusions can be drawn.
Henry Morris, Medical Men in Parliament: An Address with Additional Remarks on the Need of Medical Representation in

The Idea of the Medical Member in Edwardian Britain
That relatively few medical practitioners sought to enter Parliament before 1910 is explicable in terms of an absence of financial and professional incentives. Even after 1911, when MPs received some remuneration, private income was still a prerequisite to a career in Parliament.
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Medicine, unlike law or business, was difficult to practice alongside parliamentary duties, especially if one's patient-base was outside London. Doctors, moreover, had far less reason than lawyers and others to carve such careers. Parliamentary credentials hardly featured among the many symbols of status they cultivated in order to enhance their reputations and livings in the fiercely competitive medical marketplace of the early twentieth century. An association with politics could often do more harm than good, as the general practitioner Henry Morris-Jones discovered when he gained his seat for Denbigh in 1929: not only did his income drop "from thousands of pounds to hundreds," but "two patients who had been solicitous enough to leave me a legacy changed their minds and cut me out of their wills."
13 Recollecting his involvement in politics in Gateshead around the turn of the century, Alfred Cox, the medical secretary of the BMA for much of the interwar period, warned that "active participation in political affairs, municipal or national, is not helpful to a doctor's practice," for it was "bound to make him some enemies and his attendance at meetings makes him liable to be out of the way when he is wanted professionally." 14 12. Not until after 1964 was it feasible to enter Parliament without personal wealth, financial backing, or other employment. See Rush, "Members of Parliament" (n. 9), p. 85; "Juventus," "Representation of the Profession in Parliament, " Med. Press, 16 October 1918 , p. 290. In 1918 this rose to £600 in 1937 and to £1,000 in 1947. 13 Usually, if a practitioner could not purport political agnosticism, it was expedient to trim political sails to suit those of individual patients/ patrons. Within a profession that, in Eliot Friedson's terms, was far more "client-dependent" than "colleague dependent," 15 this tactic was sufficiently well known for Punch to be able to lampoon it in the early 1900s.
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Thus practitioners who entered the Commons before World War I almost invariably had independent means, achieved either through years of elite lucrative practice, through marriage (or both, as in the case of the physician-accoucheur Sir William Overend Priestley), or through inheritance. Robert Farquharson, FRCP, was typical in entering the Commons (in 1880) shortly after succeeding to the family estate in Aberdeenshire. He was further characteristic in abandoning his medical practice once he came into his inheritance, while maintaining his medical identity in the House (where he acted as one of the main spokesmen for the profession).
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Incentives to become formally involved in politics were attenuated for many doctors by membership in their own "Commons," the BMA. 1840 -1990 (Oxford: BMJ and Clarendon Press, 1990 idem, Themselves Writ Large: The British Medical Association, 1832 -1966 (London: BMJ, 1996 Education, 1868 (Lewes: Falmer Press, 1983 ; Hilda Kean, Challenging the State? The Socialist and Feminist Educational Experience, 1900 (Brighton: Falmer Press, 1990 . MP Farquharson, the Parliamentary Bills Committee vigorously lobbied on issues such as lunacy law, nurses' registration, cremation, the "relative rank" of medical military officers, public health improvement, vaccination, and notification. Additionally, regional BMA representatives were routinely assigned sets of questions with which to quiz prospective MPs. In 1910, for example, they were instructed to ask candidates if they would support a bill guaranteeing fees to practitioners who were called out to assist midwives in emergencies; whether they would support the consolidation of the Medical and Dental Acts; and whether they would endorse a "one-portal" system of entrance into medicine through state examination. 21 Such tactics were akin to those used effectively against the Victorian medical profession by the opponents of compulsory vaccination and the Contagious Diseases Acts.
Nevertheless, by the Edwardian period it was apparent to many in the profession-not least the BMA executive-that this extraparliamentary strategy was insufficient. For one thing, as a result of the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws and the ensuing debate over national health insurance, professional interests emerged as far more central to parliamentary politics than hitherto. Uncertainty in the profession further encouraged more direct involvement in the political process. Secondly, it was increasingly clear that extraparliamentary tactics were too often unsuccessful, as in the humiliating defeat in the House in 1886 over compulsory vaccination for smallpox. 22 In a famous dispute of 1902-3 in which the profession launched a massive campaign for governmental backing in order to restore its privileges with regard to payment for duties in coroners' courts, neither a personal delegation to the lord chancellor nor the backing of the Times achieved the objective. A long editorial in the BMJ vented frustration at the government's lack of support for the profession, leading to the suggestion that doctors should vote in unison to unseat the government at the forthcoming election. Ironically, the profession's feeling of political marginality in the early twentieth century was heightened by its increasing sense of social importance. The findings of the 1904 Interdepartmental Committee on Physical Deterioration shocked many people into believing that the future of the nation and its empire depended upon the physical health of the citizenry, and hence upon socio-medical interventions. Contributing to this impression were such legislative measures as the provision of ambulance services in large towns, the administration and enforcement of food and drug acts, the medical inspection and feeding of schoolchildren, the housing of the poor, health visiting, notification of births, factory acts, workmen's compensation legislation, child labor laws, and infant life protection, as well as the extensive debate around temperance and eugenics. More politically central issues, too, such as unemployment, were easily medicalized in relation to conditions of living, nutrition, sickness, age, maternal mortality, and so on. Thus, in 1909 the surgeon Sir William Job Collins, Liberal MP for St. Pancras, could insist that "the 'health of nations' no less than the 'wealth of nations' now occupies the political stage." 24 To some doctors it seemed that it "only requires time and publicity for any theory upon which medical men are agreed to become an axiom of the man in the street, and consequently the precursor of legislative enactments."
25
Professional interests, in other words, were easily dressed up as public concerns. As the BMJ recognized, "the profession at large has much to gain by the counsels of Parliament being leavened by adequate medical knowledge."
26 Yet, as it seemed to others in the profession, without a ministry of health to take charge of such matters, they could only look enviously at the exalted place of their brethren in legislatures elsewhere, especially in France. 27 This spokesman (for "the most powerful body of men in the world, if they only would realize it") not only shared the demand for a ministry of health, but also decried the lack of professional representation by any of the heads of state or political parties: "We have a Labour Party in Parliament," he expostulated; "Why not a Medical Party?" 30 Why not, indeed, echoed another doctor: "The history of the treatment in Parliament, by either of the great political parties, of medical bills and Acts, furnishes ample proof of the pressing need of our profession for medical members of the House of Commons." 31 What was new in the Edwardian period was not the medical profession's complaint that it was "without voice and powerless in the councils of the nation," 32 nor its call for "our own representatives in Parliament." 33 The BMA had made similar calls since the 1860s 34 -calls that in effect asked for entry into the democratic assembly in order undemocratically (and against parliamentary rules) to be judge of their own cause. 35 What was new, beyond the sense of urgency, was the glimmer of hope that parliamentary representation might just be practicable if a fund were created for the support of such medical candidates. This suggestion appeared in the columns of the BMJ on the eve of the election of January 1910, precisely when a history of doctors in Parliament since the sixteenth century was being composed in the same journal (in effect, legitimating a tradition that was in the process of being invented). 36 The idea for the fund was put forward by Francis Fremantle, himself one of the contributors to the BMJ 's history of doctors in Parliament.
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Medical veteran of the Boer War 38 and author of Health and Empire (1911), Fremantle was to enter the Commons as Conservative member for St. Albans in 1919, a seat he would retain until his death in 1943. In 1910, however, he was medical officer of health and chief school medical officer for Hertfordshire. Although a recent inheritance had left him sufficiently well off to devote himself wholly to national politics, 39 he realized the impossibility of such a move for the average general practitioner or medical officer of health unless financially assisted. "It is," he maintained, "almost as easy for a camel to pass through the needle's eye as for a medical man in active consultative work to become a member of Parliament." 40 Fremantle reckoned that it had cost him £300 a year to nurture his abortive candidature for the Rotherhithe constituency in 1906, and his expenses for the election of 1910 would have cost him another £800. 41 Thus he estimated that a sum of £700 a year would probably be necessary for each candidate to pay his current political and his occasional electioneering expenses, and to supplement any private income he may have; £1,400 a year and £100 for the organization required might thus secure two candidates, one in each party. 41. This estimate of election expenses was close to the average around this time: see F. W. S. Craig, ed., British Electoral Facts, 1885 -1975 (London: Macmillan, 1976 , p. 73. Fremantle was forced to withdraw from the 1910 election because of a clause in the Local Government Act of 1888 that ruled that employees of county councils were ineligible to serve in Parliament.
42. Fremantle, "Medical Profession" (n. 36), p. 118.
necessary for "representatives, chosen between the ages of 30 and 40 as men of professional merit, sound judgment, and strong political convictions, to devote their lives to this work as to any other speciality in the profession."
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Among those who may have been persuaded by Fremantle's suggestion (though clearly not by his ageism) was Sir William Whitla, the fiftynine-year-old recent president of the BMA, who was to become the MP for Queen's University, Belfast, in December 1918. But Fremantle's hope that someone would come forward to inaugurate his scheme was lost in the relative satisfaction deriving from the election results of January 1910: twenty-four doctors put themselves forward as candidates, of whom fourteen were successful-an increase of five over the previous Parliament. 44 Among the newly elected was Christopher Addison, formerly professor of anatomy in Sheffield, and subsequently the first minister of health.
The profession also derived satisfaction from the fact that the two Scottish University seats stayed in their pocket. One of the occupants of these, from 1906 until his death in March 1927, was Sir Henry Craik. Craik was an educationalist, not a doctor, but for the whole of his political career he acted as one of the BMA's representatives in Parliament and, uniquely, was made an honorary member of the BMA and admitted to its counsels. 45 Craik was probably involved with the entry into Parliament in August 1917 of fellow-Conservative William Watson Cheyne, the former president of the Royal College of Surgeons, who was to sit as the representative of Edinburgh and St. Andrews universities (the seat created in 1867 and first represented by Lyon Playfair). Candidates for the university seats were usually elected without contest, and Cheyne was typical in being nominated by the medical deans of both universities. 46 The physician and psychologist Sir James Crichton-Browne was offered the same seat in 1910 but, for lack of salary, stood aside and supported the Conservative candidate, Robert Finlay (M.D. Edinburgh 1863), who held 43. Ibid., p. 118. 44 . In addition to the thirteen named in "General Election," BMJ, 29 January 1910, p. 283, was Robert Finlay. Also elected in 1910 was William Glyn-Jones (1869 , the Parliamentary Secretary for the Pharmaceutical Society who was qualified in law, not medicine.
45. BMJ, 4 November 1922, p. 889; 11 November 1922, p. 945; 8 November 1924, p. 872; 26 March 1927 , pp. 589-99. 46. BMJ, 18 August 1917 . Cheyne took up his seat in December 1918 but, due to the redistribution of the Scottish universities' seats later that year, was required to be reelected.
the seat until his appointment as lord chancellor in December 1916 (whereupon he became the first medical practitioner to enter a British cabinet, although by then he had long abandoned medicine for law).
47
The university seats were a crucial means to medical representation in Parliament, and they were valued all the more by the BMA and other medico-political organizations for the party-political independence that the House customarily granted their occupants. Over the interwar period they brought not only nine medical MPs to Westminster, but at least ten professional allies (Table 1 ). However, they were not a path to Parliament for the rank-and-file doctors who Fremantle had in mind. Nor were they entirely free from controversy, despite the allegedly nonpartisan views of the nominated medical candidates. When Emeritus Professor of Midwifery and Gynecology Sir Alexander Simpson (1835 Simpson ( -1916 stood as Liberal candidate against Finlay in 1910, the inability of a medical candidate to stand above party and politics was only too plain. Given how little "we have gained from purely medical representatives in the House of Commons," remarked one of Simpson's detractors, what was the point of doctors wasting their votes on them?
48 As would be widely apparent after World War I, medical representation in Parliament often served to divide the profession along party-political lines-a "Medical Party" in Parliament was not, alas, comparable to a "Labour Party," though it might be equally heterogeneous.
Promoting Dr. Dash, the Doctors' Delegate
The general election of December 1910 was the last before Lloyd George's famous coalition-perpetuating "Coupon Election" of December 1918, which increased the electorate by some ten million, including six million women. The intervening years were arguably the most important in the politics of British medicine before the NHS. National Health Insurance (NHI) came into effect in 1913; Poor Law medical services underwent reform; unqualified practice, veterinary medicine, dentistry, and patent Doctor (1910) , perceived salvation in a nationalized or municipalized medical system with efficient, rationalized functions and a salaried profession. Still others, such as Bertrand Dawson, imagined the future in terms of health centers within which general practitioners (GPs) and outreach services would come under the military-style command of elite consultant specialists like themselves.
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The divisions within British medicine placed the BMA increasingly under threat. Spurned by many doctors after the passage of the NHI Act as a "futile fighting machine," 51 the Association was challenged by several alternative medical organizations. Shortly after NHI came into force, the Medical Practitioners' Union (MPU) was established (initially as the Panel Medico-Political Union), committed to promoting legislation that would extend the medical care offered by the state, while at the same time protecting the autonomy of GPs. For Christopher Addison, seeking the backing of the medical profession for his Ministry of Health Bill (a ministry now called for in the interests of the public and the unification of services, rather than, as formerly, by the profession, for the guarding of privileges), the MPU was held to speak for more doctors than the 49. Alfred Cox to James Kerr, 15 February 1929 "hopeless crowd" in the BMA. 52 Certainly, many practitioners at this time felt that the BMA was "governed by a hierarchy of consultants" who sought to usurp the powers of the General Medical Council: the BMA was "a cruel and relentless trades-union," it was declared, whereas the MedicoPolitical Union "proclaims medicine a "trade" and, naked and unashamed, glories in trades-unionism." 53 The editors of the MPU's journal, the Medical World, were adamant that the BMA had never existed as a political force, but they were nevertheless bothered that the public still thought it "an influential body whose advice carries weight with legislators." 54 In 1912, the State Medical Service Association was formed, followed by the National Medical Union and an Association of Panel Committees. In 1919, the British Federation of Medical and Allied Societies brought together some forty-seven different societies interested in national health, excluding the BMA. 55 All this was evidence, as one doctor put it, of the profound distrust, suspicion, disappointment, or disgust which at present exists in the minds of many with regard to the British Medical Association as an efficient, reliable, virile, up-to-date organization capable of dealing with medico-political and sociological problems with vision, imagination, grit, and some of the enthusiasm of youth; and to be relied on to lead the profession and the public on questions affecting health safety through the many difficulties and dangers of the transitional and reconstruction periods of the new age now upon us.
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In view of these postwar divisions and the deep distrust of the BMA, as well as the public's disbelief in "the purity of medical objects," 57 the idea of doctors electing their own MPs was naïve at best. Which medical interests would a medical MP represent? While, in the wake of the bitter lessons of NHI, most practitioners felt that it was crucial not to let government ride roughshod over their interests, the absence of a united profession, on the one hand, and the problem of working though the party-political system, on the other, were formidable checks to the idea's fulfillment. But the alternatives seemed worse. The BMA's practice of medical lobbying from outside the Commons was limited, not least because other medical lobby groups came to adopt the same strategy.
58
The option of operating as a medical trade union affiliated to or incorporated within the Labour Party was even less appealing to the majority of the profession, given the Labour Party's apparent commitment to a state medical service, the municipalization of hospitals, and a salaried medical service.
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It was, in fact, these Labour Party pledges that finally pushed the BMA into setting up a fund to promote medical MPs. Bournemouth practitioner George Mahomed, responding to the Labour Party's Manifesto published in the Times of 3 January 1918, was driven to write to Cox proposing that a fund be established for medical candidates at the next election "not for medico-political objectives but for general purposes."
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The options, Mahomed perceived, were either that doctors demanded admission to the Labour Party ("as they now admit train workers") and arranged with the Party for putting up suitable medical candidates at the next election, or that they collaborated in the same way with the Nationalist Party (the right-wing Tory breakaway party organized in 1917 by 60. George Mahomed to Cox, 6 January 1918, BMAA, SA/BMA/H.6. Little is known of (Arthur) George Sulieman Mahomed. A self-confessed Tory, he emerges from the correspondence with Cox as astute and canny. According to his entry in the Medical Directory he was the author of a paper on "The State and the Doctor," which I have not been able to trace. There is a reference in the Lancet (1 January 1910, p. 27 ) to a paper by him on "Atmospheric Electricity" delivered to the Edinburgh Medico-Chirurgical Society. He last appears in the Medical Directory in 1944; no obituary has been found. It is likely that he was one of the "several children" of the restless medical enthusiast Frederick H. H. Akber Mahomed, FRCP (1849-84): see Lives of the Fellows of the Royal College of Physicians of London, vol. 4, 1826 (London: RCPL, 1955 Bournemouth MP Sir Henry Page Croft). Cox thanked Mahomed for his "interesting suggestions," but reminded him that in politics most doctors were citizens first and doctors second-they were not disposed to vote along medical lines even if the opportunity presented itself; when the idea of supporting parliamentary candidates had been raised "several years ago," he added, "the political aspect at once flared up and many men objected strongly to any of their money being spent on . . . [party] candidates."
61 As for the BMA casting its lot with the Labour Party, "there would," he believed, "be very strong objection-sufficient to split the Association from top to bottom." 62 Yet Cox was not wholly dismissive: "all difficulties are made to be overcome," he submitted in subsequent correspondence with Mahomed, appreciating that medical allies in the House "would be a great help to this office in dealing with Parliamentary matters" 63 (not least in opposing Addison's Bill for the Ministry of Health if it did not endorse a medical advisory council). 64 The way forward might be to "approach candidates who had already been adopted by one or other of the political parties, see how far they are prepared to back our idea and then attempt to get our members to support them (a) by votes and influence [and] Establishing a fund to support medical candidates to Parliament was one thing, fulfilling its aims quite another. Apart from the not inconsiderable problem of raising subscriptions from the BMA membership, 70 formidable difficulties surrounded the locating of constituency seats worthy of contesting and in which constituents would be willing to be represented by a doctor whose interests might well be sectional (ideally, would be sectional, as far as the BMA was concerned). To stand for a particular party, however, meant meeting the selection criteria of party whips and secretaries. There was also the problem of recruiting doctors who would be willing to sacrifice relatively secure medical careers for risky political ones. A further obstacle was that of deterring from the Fund those medical candidates who were not likely to be wholly supportive of the BMA; thus interviews were necessary to determine applicants' opinions on BMA-sensitive issues.
71 As Cox and others had foreseen, such 71. The Parliamentary Subcommittee ruled that a medical candidate "should, by his past work and experience, have proved his knowledge of, and loyalty to, the interests of the profession as expressed through the British Medical Association" (Harman, "Parliamentary Representation" [n. 69], p. 409). Applicants for funding were asked four questions during interviews, the wrong reply to any of which would disqualify them: "1. Do you favour socialisation or municipalisation of the voluntary hospitals? 2. Are you in favour of any form a fund was bound to be trouble-and it was. Although in 1918 six carefully vetted "safe" candidates were found, and only £150 actually disbursed from the Fund (see Table 2 ), two Labour Party medical candidates (John Kynaston and Peter Macdonald) applied to the Fund and had to be politely rejected. 72 Among the Party Whips, only the Liberals were able to offer a seat-an offer that went to BMA Councilor Henry Brackenbury, who appears not to have accepted it, though he was to stand again in 1922 as a Liberal for Walthamstow (with exceptionally lavish BMA funding) and again in 1937 for one of the university seats. Like the six "safe" candidates in 1918, Brackenbury, the dominant policymaker and officeholder in the BMA in the interwar period, never made it to the Commons.
Not least of the problems faced by the BMA in setting up its Parliamentary Election Fund were opposition and competition. Among some there was "genuine alarm" at the idea of "this discredited anachronism" seeking to "represent" their interests in Parliament.
73 (In 1918 the BMA still represented only some 15,000 of the 43,000 doctors on the Medical Register, a relative fall in membership.) 74 Others doubted the wisdom of the BMA's acting on "its lonesome" in this regard, rather than seeking collaboratively to create a unified medical lobby within Parliament.
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of legislation which will go in the direction of making the medical profession into a wholetime state salaried medical service? 3. If you are not in favour of this will you do your best inside the councils of the Labour Party to persuade them not to introduce such legislation? 4. If such legislation is introduced by the Labour Party could you promise (a) to vote against it or (b) refrain from voting?" See, for example, Alfred Cox to James Kerr, 26 77. At meetings on the future of the medical profession under "a national health ministry" in June 1918, Cheyne suggested that "for the present the profession should confine itself to advocating a Ministry of Health" ("The Future of the Medical Profession under a National Health Ministry, Discussion at the Royal Society of Medicine," BMJ, 15 June 1918, p. 673). See also "Minute of the Conference held at the Royal College of Physicians on Friday, the 1st November, 1918, on the proposed legislation to establish a Ministry of Health," RSMA. As appreciated by the medical correspondent to the Times, "The truth is that Dr. Addison is in a very strong position. The medical profession is not" (26 May 1919, p. 17) . GPs were generally more concerned about the proposed Ministry than consultants, fearful that under it they would lose the capital they had invested in their practices; they also distrusted medical members of the House of Commons, who they believed came largely from the consultant class and had never been in touch with the needs of the GP: see Sidney Matthews, "The Future of the Medical Profession," BMJ, medical opinion behind the idea of a cross-party, cross-sectional committee. Few disputed that more medical men were required in the Commons, and that the urgency for this had "primarily arisen in consequence of the Ministry of Health Bill." 80 Nor was there any dissent from Morris's opening remarks at Steinway Hall that "the time has arrived when the medical profession should take steps to show its corporate value to the public and the State." 81 In general, there was agreement with the wishful view of the Lancet that "the democracy of the future is sure to make increasing use of special knowledge directed to generally benevolent ends, while setting a decreasing value upon political machinations. The doctor in Parliament . . . fits such a picture exactly."
82 Encouraged, the temporarily constituted MPC worked assiduously during the lead-up to the December 1918 election to recruit and financially assist doctors' entry into Parliament, competing with the efforts of the BMA. And like the BMA, it was heartened by the results of the election, which increased the number of medical MPs from 13 to 17 (though 5 were Sinn Feiners who did not take their seats).
After the election the MPC was turned into a permanent body, less concerned to recruit and help fund medical parliamentary candidates than to unify the doctors elected to the House. An executive of twenty was assembled, representing most of the major interest groups in medicine, and it met twice yearly. Council, 17 February 1920, p. 43, RSMA; Lancet, 10 May 1919, pp. 808-11; 19 July 1919, pp. 113, 121-23; BMJ, 10 May 1919, pp. 801-2; 17 May 1919 , p. 858. When Moynihan, in May 1918 the passage of the Ministry Bill, as Frank Honigsbaum has noted, the Federation was allowed to drift into division and oblivion, and it was all but defunct by 1923. 85 Confusingly, however, the old MPC was not lost in the formation and dissolution of the Federation: it was reassembled on a cross-party basis and met monthly throughout the interwar years, acting as a coordinating and advisory body on medical issues within Westminster. Although it was never very politically effective, 86 by the 1930s it had shorn most of the party political divisions that had racked it in the 1920s and was increasingly operating in the interests of the BMA. Once the Socialists Alfred Salter, Leslie Haden-Guest, and Somerville Hastings were out of the way, right-wing BMA politicos largely took it over: the Tory Fremantle was chairman until his death in 1943, the Independent and rabid antisocialist Ernest Graham-Little was secretary, and the Liberal Whip and unofficial doctor of the Commons, Morris-Jones, was treasurer.
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The fate of the BMA's Parliamentary Election Committee Fund was more controversial. Although on the eve of the election of December 1923 the BMA was lamenting that "the way in which the Fund has been supported leads the Trustees to the opinion either that the profession is not so anxious as it was represented to be to get medical members into Parliament or that the Fund is not as well known as it ought to be," 88 by the 1930s they might have choked on their words. Navigating the politics of the Fund in the 1930s got worse before the Fund was finally declared "exhausted" in 1939. 89 The main problem lay in turning away applicants 90 Although BMA bosses had endeavored from the start to reassure their members that "we shall never see on the hustings-'Vote for Dr. Dash the Doctors' Delegate,'" 91 in practice (inevitably, perhaps) they appeared as engineering just that. Among other factors working against the Fund in the 1930s were the ethical implications of supporting medical candidates who, in canvassing votes, could be seen to be breaching the rules against doctors' self-advertisement. Some voters might even be a doctor's own patients. 92 Here was a hornet's nest that the BMA could well live without, and it was all the more inclined to do so in view of the impression that the "real work" in Parliament relating to medicine was done not by medical MPs, but by the Ministry of Health and other departments. 93 Yet, if only because the Medical Practitioners' Union also had a "Political Objects Fund" to serve the same ends, 94 it was difficult for the BMA wholly to extricate itself from this initiative-at least not before July 1938, when the MPU resolved to divert its Fund to hiring a parliamentary agent dedicated to representing their interests in Parliament. 95 Whereas the BMA in 1937 had also resolved to appoint a parliamentary agent, the appointee was not intended to be a lobbyist within the House, but a legal firm specializing in reporting and advising on legislative 95. MPU Minutes, 6 July 1938. Although on 8 March 1939 the MPU Executive resolved to give £200 to the election campaign for their then-President, Leslie Heffernan, the money was to be raised by each Council member contributing £20, repayable at 5 percent interest.
96. The resolution for a parliamentary agent was made by the BMA's Medico-Parliamentary Committee on 2 January 1937, estimating the cost of the agent at between £70 and £100 per annum. The BMA executive agreed to this on 22 May 1937. Fremantle wrote to BMA Secretary G. C. Anderson on 25 August 1937 commending the idea and hoping that the agent would "co-operate with the Parliamentary Medical Committee by constant concerned with legislation that might affect their interests. The BMA had previously debated and rejected what the MPU came in effect to implement, the idea of parliamentary "delegation rather than representation." 97 The MPU's "agent," Thomas Edward Groves, a fruit farmer and barrister who was Labour MP for West Ham from 1922 to 1945, was paid £100 per annum to have specific questions raised in Parliament. From the time of his appointment in January 1940 until June 1942, he succeeded in having between 900 and 1,000 questions asked in the House "by various members of Parliament."
98 "Cash for questions," it seems, was not an ethical issue, although at the time it was seen by some doctors in the House as compromising their independence.
Biographical Profiles
For all their efforts to secure reliable allies in the Commons, neither the BMA nor the MPU (nor the Medical Parliamentary Committee when it was first established) was ever able to muster more than a handful of trustworthy medical MPs. In part, this was due to the double difficulty of locating willing and able medical candidates and viable constituencies. It also hinged on the fact that medical MPs, however supportive they might be of professional interests, were unwilling to stake their political careers on them. Richard H. being on the Council of the BMA, that his first duty as an MP must be to his conscience, second to his party, third to his constituency, and only after that to his profession. 100 The Oxford professor of medicine Farquhar Buzzard, while standing a second time in 1937 at a by-election for one of the Oxford University seats, told the then BMA secretary (and future MP) Charles Hill, "it would not do for me to stand as a medical man pure and simple, although I have not disguised the fact that my professional knowledge may be of service in the House of Commons." 101 Most in the profession were only too aware of the view on the Left that what was wanted was "not representative medical men but medical men as representatives of the people in Parliament." 102 Hence, it was often expedient to mumble the view entertained by the Lancet in 1917, that doctors in Parliament were to act "not as advocates of their class but as exponents of the views of that class where questions of public importance are at issue."
103
While principle and expediency may have been the reason that some medical MPs avoided touting corporate interests in the House, for others it was more a matter of prioritizing political careers over medico-political ones. Prudence only, perhaps, led Watson Cheyne to announce after his election in 1917 that he was "to give up private practice in the near future and devote his energies to learning a new science-the business of politics."
104 Like other elder medical statesmen, he could well afford to make good his promise. But many others had no need, for they had long retired from practice and had ceased to have much interest in medical matters. (Approximately 40 percent of the 159 for whom we have reliable data were over fifty years of age when they first stood for election.) Some doctors sought entry into the Commons as a means to fulfil lifelong political ambitions, which they sustained along with their medical practice. Others (such as W. H. R. Rivers) did so because they became politicized at certain points in their lives, while still others only gradually became preoccupied with politics, sometimes to the exclusion of any parallel commitment to medicine. 105 Others, however, were medical truants, in some cases long before they had entered or proposed to enter the Commons. Sir John Worthington, for example, had long abandoned medicine for business when, aged fifty-nine, he gained his seat for Labour in 1931. Sir Henry Lunn of Lincolnshire, who sought to become Liberal MP for Boston in 1910 (aged fifty-one) and for Brighton in 1923, had little medicine to leave behind: qualified in 1887, for that year only he worked as a medical missionary in India; subsequently, most of his energies went into his travel agency, militant Methodism, and the peace movement. 106 The surgeon Henry Jackson, Conservative member for Wandsworth between 1924 and 1937, did not join the medical profession until he was nearly forty; before then, he had been a fellow of Downing College, Cambridge, and a lecturer in the natural sciences. A "Lancashire lad," he made his name on the Public Health Committee of the Wandsworth Council, and had an abiding interest in the London Voluntary Hospitals Committee-but he took little part in medical politics at a higher level. In the Commons he seldom entered debate, and he was respected mostly for his knowledge and committee work on transport, the subject on which he delivered his maiden speech in March 1925. 107 Another truant was William A. Chapple, the author of, among other works, The Evils of Alcohol (1903) It cannot be told if there were others like Alfred Salter who came to wonder if they were right to have given up medicine for politics; 110 but, for certain, many sought politics because they were only too keen to escape medicine, whether for financial or other reasons. Unsurprisingly, this was often the case among the approximately 33 percent of the 159 who were under forty when they first sought election and who had as yet little investment in the profession. One such was the reluctant GP Donald McIntosh Johnson, who first stood as a Conservative candidate for Bury in 1935 when he was aged thirty-two. Four years after qualifying in medicine in 1926, Johnson qualified in law-joining at least seventeen others in our sample who also held legal qualifications.
111 Another was Isaac McIver of Fort William, who had barely qualified and begun to practice as a medical officer of health when he stood as a Labour candidate for Argyllshire in 1924, aged thirty-one.
There were others, however, even when they entered politics relatively soon after qualifying, who sought to keep a hand in the profession in one way or another-although sometimes not noticeably so while in the Commons.
112 Illustrative is Samuel Segal (later Baron Segal), who had been qualified for only eight years and was practicing as a GP in London 109. Obituary, BMJ, 31 October 1936, p. 901. 110. Brockway, Bermondsey Story (n. 87) 114 Like his medical colleagues further to the left, he was much concerned with the preservation of a free democracy, but like most medical aspirants to Parliament he did not assert any special relationship between medical knowledge (or practice) and democratic politics.
Another medical author (as well as barrister) and would-be MP was John Hargreaves Harley Williams, best remembered for his book Doctors Differ (1946) . Soon after medically qualifying in 1923, Williams became involved in the National Association for the Prevention of Tuberculosis, which led him to believe that he was "probably the first doctor to be 113. See obituary in BMJ, 10 January 1953, p. 106; Hugh Wansey Bayly, Triple Challenge. . . . A Doctor's Memoirs of the Years 1914 (London: Hutchinson, 1934 Sutherland) , and antivaccinationists (W. Collins). And they emerged from different political milieus: at least 49 of the 159 gained their appetite for national politics through local or municipal politics, while another 40 gained theirs through regional and national medical politics (36 through the BMA). Eighteen were involved with the Socialist Medical Association; 12 with the Medical Practitioners' Union; and 9 had backgrounds in Irish politics. Regionalism could further divide them: 51 were from London, 49 from the north of England, 17 from the south, 17 from Scotland, 5 from Wales, 12 from Ireland, with 8 unknown. Gender played a lesser role in differentiating them, since only 5 were women.
Given this diversity, those who sought to harness medical opinion in the House could do little more than try and make the best of what came their way, currying allies where they could. Two days after the election on 6 December 1923, for example, Cox wrote to Fremantle:
So far as I can see at present there are four Labour medical M.P.s of whom you know one-[ John Henry] Williams of Burry Port. He seems to be of no particular account. But the other three are pretty good stuff if only they were not taken with the whole-time Medical Service heresy. Somerville Hastings and Haden Guest are very good, sound and decent fellows, whom I think you 121. H. B. W. Morgan, Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, vol. 230, 15 July 1929, cols. 105-6. will find useful. . . . [George E.] Spero, the new Liberal medical M.P. is, I am told, an active and able youngish man. He is in practice at Leicester. 122 Spero, who had qualified only four years before this and who simultaneously sought his fortune in radio manufacturing, was in fact compelled to forfeit his seat in April 1930 upon being declared bankrupt. 123 Clearly, even those with corporate designs could be both thrown by events and beguiled by personalities uncertain or unknown.
Conclusions
By any standards, the "movement" to place doctors in Parliament in interwar Britain cannot be reckoned a success. In numerical terms, if in no others, it hardly begins to compare with the rise of the physicianlegislators of late nineteenth-century France-by some accounts, "one of the most striking features of modern political history."
124 From the perspective of the British medical profession today, the movement might be seen as flawed from the outset, inasmuch as it was not calculated to enroll the public or instill a popular faith in the profession. In this respect, British medical MPs were unlike their French counterparts, who secured their place partly on the basis of a popular mandate to heal the body politic in the wake of the Franco-Prussian War.
125 German doctors, too, after World War I-desperate for precisely such a mandate-sought Reichstag representation partly as a means to "educate the people" as to the value of the profession. 126 The movement in Britain, however, was intended primarily as a means to protect the profession against legislation that might circumscribe its economic freedom and monopoly. Rarely was the public appealed to, and more rarely still did the public spontaneously endorse medical representation. 127 The elitist, undemocratic wont of the profession's leaders was too well known. 128 Add to this the fragmented nature of the profession over the interwar period, and it is hardly surprising that medical MPs were vulnerable to each and every practical obstacle that Cox and others had anticipated. Consistently, party-political, constituency, and personal interests and ambitions overrode or cut across those of profession.
129 Not only were relatively few doctors successful in their bid to enter the House, but few of those who succeeded held corporate interests uppermost. Fremantle is one of the exceptions, although even he had other interests and was careful to be seen acting not simply as a toady for the BMA. By the mid-1930s it was clear to both the BMA and the Medical Practitioners' Union that the use of paid parliamentary delegates was a far more efficient and reliable means to safeguard medical interests in the Commons than attempting to locate and fund prospective medical representatives. The BMA, unable to pursue "delegation" as much as it would have liked, more or less reverted to its nineteenth-century extraparliamentary strategy of lobbying MPs-albeit with diminishing emphasis vis-à-vis other professionalizing strategies. 130 Within the Commons, medical MPs evinced little professional cohesion, even though the profession as a whole was often vilified for acting like a trades union. 131 Ironically, in the 1930s, in a context of sharpened party politics and ideological divide, there were signs of greater professional bonding. In 1935, the editor of the BMJ felt that "never before has the medical profession been represented in Parliament with so much unity and efficiency. And never, according to competent observers, has Parliament shown less of the old suspicion of 'the doctors. '" 132 Significantly, the BMJ neglected even to list the twenty-four medical candidates competing in the 1935 election. Revealing, too, is the delivery of Fremantle's Chadwick Lecture in November 1936, "The Doctor's Mandate in Parliament" (italics mine), which emphasized the political independence of doctors in the House-"regardless of dogmas or precedent." 133 Such omissions and commissions were intended, in effect, to stabilize the boundaries between medicine and politics within the profession. In the parliamentary sphere, as in the medical trade generally, this was a professionalizing and social-status-seeking move-a means to appear consensus-orientated, as opposed to conflict-directed in the manner of trades unions.
Such aspirations were apparent from the start of the "movement" to place doctors in Parliament, as reflected most startlingly perhaps in the fact that nearly 30 percent of the interwar parliamentary aspirants stood for the Liberal Party. By the early 1920s it was widely apparent that the Liberals would never get back into power, yet "Liberal" continued to signify the assertion of meritocratic values and social welfare interests over those of "party" (where "party" equaled the protection of landed or inherited wealth and status or, increasingly, the interests of organized labor). Even in the 1940s there were would-be medical MPs who preferred to campaign under a "Liberal" rather than an "Independent" ticket. 134 For the BMA, this above-party professional image was expedient in a context in which it was coming to represent some 70 percent of doctors on the Medical Register, many of whom were not "professionals" in the Victorian sense, but rather (like teachers) salaried employees of the state or local government. 135 Yet, in part because of these growing professional differences and the sharpening political divisions of the times, an above-party professional image was difficult to sustain. As the BMA knew well from the pile of hostile letters it received from its members after funding the Labour candidate Leslie Haden-Guest in 1935, an "aboveparty" political consensus within the medical profession was far from being established. 136 The more profound change in the medical profession's persona in Parliament during the interwar period took place not in the Commons, but in that "other place." Whereas before World War I there was only one medical Lord-Lord Lister 137 -by the mid-1930s there were three, all of whom were eminent as both consultants and medico-political activists: Tommy Horder, Bertrand Dawson, and Berkeley Moynihan. In the company of medical philanthropists such as Beaverbrook, John Baring (Lord Revelstoke), and Viscount Nuffield, these men exercised and reaped far more authority than they could have had in the Commons. And in the much less politically adversarial surroundings of the Lords, doctors could chose their duties to fit their gentlemanly lifestyles. As Sir James CrichtonBrowne remarked in 1936, the "exigencies of medical practice [that] were incompatible with the [political] performance of Parliamentary duties . . . did not apply in an equal degree to the House of Lords."
138 In effect, even before the university seats were abolished in 1948 by the Representation of the People Act, the House of Lords had begun to replace them as the medical profession's parliamentary power base. The upper house was no place for the machinations of the BMA, however; ruling here were the quiet, informal networks of power of the consultant elite of the Royal Colleges. Significantly, perhaps, by 1955 the Medical Practitioners' Union (having lost out to the BMA in terms of members and influence, and anxious now to advertise itself as "nonpolitical") was holding its annual dinners in the House of Lords.
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While the number of prospective medical candidates for Parliament may inform us on the state of the medical profession between the wars, the number of doctors elected to Parliament cannot be taken to index the power of the profession, nor even medical opinion in the Commons. After all, many MPs without medical training often spoke authoritatively on medical matters. An indeterminate number of them had vested medical interests, ranging from involvement in pharmaceutical companies to the governing of voluntary hospitals and other medical charities-to say nothing of significant personal relations with powerful members of the medical elite.
140 Some also had keen interests in medico-politics, 141 While other nonmedical MPs were not averse to reminding their colleagues that "doctors were as prone to be cranks as other people," 142 some held views decidedly antagonistic to the profession and were able effectively to assert them in Parliament. 143 Often these were MPs (and sometimes cabinet ministers) who had had positive experiences with alternative healers and faddists of one sort or another; in the tradition of nineteenth-century ideologues of free trade, they were only too happy to challenge the profession's would-be monopoly on healing. 144 House, many soon found (as Fremantle did) that medical opinion was not wanted for its own sake, so much as for glossing policy decisions already made by government ministers. 146 Cheyne may well have spoken "with authority and without dogmatism on what he knew" (as an obituarist lauded), 147 but most medical MPs, if they cared at all, would have recognized the large gulf that existed between their profession's rhetoric for entering Parliament-the effectiveness of firsthand advocacy of medical opinion 148 -and the realities facing them once within the Commons. Over specific issues, moreover, whether therapeutic or medico-political, medical MPs frequently expressed contrary views. As a result, they were easily kept divided.
I have not sought in this paper to address the question of medical authority in Parliament-whether witnessed by insiders or outsiders, and whether on the floor of the House, in the Lords, or in committees. Along with an analysis of medical discourse in Parliament and its possible material power, this topic remains one for future research-research perhaps best conducted through attention to specific debates.
149 Also left untouched is the question of the relative importance of local as opposed to national assemblies for medico-politics, and the interactions between local constituency issues and medical professional ones. Nor, finally, have I pursued the possibly deeper cognitive relations existing between "doing medicine" and "doing politics."
More modestly, I have sought to identify and illuminate the neglected historical narrative of doctors' efforts to enter Parliament in interwar Britain. For the most part, the story is one of a less-than-successful experiment in pressure-group politics, and of the shifting and competitive strategies involved in the effort to gain a protectionist voice within the national legislature. While providing a further window on the troubled politics of medicine during the interwar years, the story also reflects the wider culture of politics, health care, and would-be expertise within which, and through which, those troubles-the divisions in the profession-were expressed. For the profession to have successfully exercised corporate interests in Parliament it would have had to have precisely that cohesiveness which the history of the efforts to promote medical MPs in interwar Britain reveals as wanting. Hence, from this case study, it is by no means evident simply from the fact that professionals sought to enter Parliament that the making of "professional society" was also entered upon, or that the number alone of such professional parliamentary aspirants bears its signature. If professional society is that in which specialized expert interests and social ideals govern, or at least inform governance, there is little in the material presented here to suggest that the medical profession as a profession added anything to it-nor at all that doctors enhanced their own self-rule through their Parliamentary initiatives.
